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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
MARTIN L. HOCKING, and JUDITH 
C. HOCKING, 
Plaintiffs and 
Appellants, 
MERLYN TINGEY ROBERTS, n/k/a 
MERLYN TINGEY de la MELENA, 
Defendant and 
Appellee, 
CASE NO. 91505 
Priority No. 11 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction over this case is vested in this Court pursuant 
to Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 3 (1991). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law in 
ruling that appellee Merlyn de la Melena was entitled to summary 
judgment determining the long-standing fence line the legal bound-
ary under the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. 
2. Whether the trial court erred in finding that no genuine 
issues of material fact exist to preclude summary judgment entered 
against appellants. 
3. Whether appellants are entitled to costs. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine 
issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. Utah State Coalition of Senior 
Citizens v. Utah Power & Light, 776 P. 2d 632, 634 (Utah 1989); Utah 
R. Civ. P. 56(c). The burden of establishing the non-existence of 
a genuine issue of material fact is, of course, on the moving 
party. See e.g., Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986). 
However, once the moving party has met this initial burden, the 
burden shifts to the non-moving party, to designate "specific facts 
showing there is a genuine issue for trial.11 Celotex, 477 U.S. at 
324. It is essential to note that the non-moving party in a 
summary judgment "must do more than simply show that there is some 
metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. 
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). The 
central inquiry is "whether the evidence presents a sufficient 
disagreement to require submission to a jury whether it is so one-
sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law. " Anderson v. 
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).* 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On or about September 27, 1990, appellants Martin L. 
Hocking and Judith C. Hocking (hereinafter referred to as 
"Hockings" or "appellants") through their counsel, Hollis S. Hunt, 
filed a complaint in the Second Judicial District Court against 
lrThe Utah Court of Appeals has expressly approved of and adopted the United States 
Supreme Court's approach to summary judgment set out in Celotex. See, e.g., Reeves v. 
Gigy Pharmaceutical, inc., 764 P.2d 636, 642 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Robinson v. Intermoun-
tain Health Care, Inc., 740 P.2d 262, 264 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). Moreover, when the Utah 
rules are modeled after the federal rules, Utah courts often look to federal decisional law 
to assist in application of procedural devices. See, e.g., State v. Kay, 717 P.2d 1294, 1299 
(Utah 1986); Nelson v. Stoker, 669 P.2d 390, 392-93 (Utah 1983). Because Utah R. Civ. P. 
56(c) is modeled after and virtually identical to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, this Court may follow 
recent United States Supreme Court decisions interpreting summary judgment standards. 
Utah case law has long interpreted the shifting of burdens between the movant and 
nonmovant to be the same procedural vehicle described by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., 
Dupler v. Yates, 351 P.2d 624 (Utah 1960). 
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appellee Merlyn Tingey de la Melena (hereinafter referred to as "de 
la Melena" or "appellee") to quiet title on a 12f x 120f strip of 
property. (See R. 1-10.) On May 6, 1991, appellants filed a 
notice of request for withdrawal of their counsel, Hollis S. Hunt, 
and entered a notice of appearance as pro se plaintiffs, filed a 
motion to amend and supplement the complaint, and filed a motion 
for summary judgment against de la Melena. (See R. 34-237. ) De la 
Melena filed a cross-motion for summary judgment and a hearing was 
held before the trial court on September 3, 1991. (See R. 606-
706. ) The trial court issued a ruling and an order granting de la 
Melena1s motion for summary judgment. (See Exhibit "1" and R. 
913. ) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Hockings and de la Melena are adjoining landowners in 
Centerville, Utah. (The party!s respective lots are hereinafter 
referred to as the "Hocking lot" and the "de la Melena lot"; see 
drawing of property and fence configurations in case, attached as 
Exhibit "2".) In 1947, William Tingey and Sylvia Tingey, who are 
the parents of de la Melena, purchased the de la Melena lot from 
William Evans. William Tingey understood that they had purchased 
a lot that consisted of 100 feet from north to south. Tingey 
cleared the rocks and dead trees off the lot and began farming over 
to what he thought was the boundary line, where the existing fence 
stands between the de la Melena and Hocking lots. He assumed that 
someone had "stepped off" the 100 feet to the now existing fence 
line, but he does not know how many feet he farmed. (See William 
Tingey depo. at 6-7, 11-12 and 19-21, attached as Exhibit "3".) 
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From 1947 to 1978, Tingey plowed, farmed and irrigated the entire 
de la Melena lot, up to the point where the existing fence line is 
situated. (See Tingey depo. at 11 and 19-20, Exhibit "3".) 
On or about October 24, 1953, Milton C. Green purchased the 
Hocking lot from Therice H. Duncan and Oretta M. Duncan. (R. 652. ) 
In 1953 or 1954, shortly after moving into the Hocking home, Green 
erected the now existing chain-link fence pursuant to a survey. 
(See Milton C. Green depo. at 7-9, attached as Exhibit "4".) Prior 
to the chain-link fence that Green built in 1953, there existed an 
old post and wire fence that, according to Green, had been in place 
for at least fifty years. (See Green depo. at 7-8, Exhibit "4".) 
Green testified that he and Tingey discussed the placement of 
the fence line and agreed that it would constitute the boundary 
between the lots. (See Green depo. at 8-9, Exhibit "4" and R. 663-
664.) After the fence was built in 1953, until 1978, twenty-five 
years later, Tingey continued to plow, plant crops, irrigate and 
farm right up to the fence. (See Tingey depo. at 13-14, Exhibit 
"3" and Green depo. at 12, Exhibit "4".) From 1953 to 1963, the 
period Green owned the Hocking lot, Green was never aware of any 
discrepancy between the fence line and the legal description of the 
lots. William Tingey, nor anyone else, ever discussed a discrepan-
cy with Green during these ten years. (See Green depo at 10-13, 
Exhibit "4" and R. 663-664.) 
On or about February 18, 1963, Green sold the Hocking lot to 
Albert J. Madsen and Jean F. Madsen. (R. 666.) Nearly six years 
later, on January 2, 1969, Martin and Judith Hockxng had the 
Hocking lot surveyed prior to purchasing the lot from the Madsens. 
The survey indicated a discrepancy of about 12 feet between the 
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fence line and the record title boundary line. (R. 668.) 
Notwithstanding the discrepancy in the survey, on March 19, 1969, 
Martin and Judith Hocking purchased the Hocking lot from the 
Madsens. (R. 670.) The Hockings never notified the Tingeys 
regarding the 1969 survey or concerning a discrepancy in the fence 
line. (R. 680. ) Tingey did not know of a discrepancy in the fence 
until the Hockings brought the matter up with de la Melena sometime 
in 1989. (See Tingey depo. at 12-13, Exhibit "3".) 
On or about February 14, 1978, the Tingeys conveyed to de la 
Melena the de la Melena lot through a warranty deed. (R. 692. ) De 
la Melena was not aware of a discrepancy in the fence line when she 
purchased the lot. (See de la Melena depo. at 20, attached as 
Exhibit "5".) The Tingeys ordered a survey on February 21, 1978 
for de la Melena so that she could use the west portion of the lot 
as collateral for her house. The survey showed that the existing 
fence line encroached on the Hockings* deeded property approximate-
ly 12 feet. (See Tingey depo. at 13-14, Exhibit "3"; de la Melena 
depo. at 11-12, Exhibit "5"; and R. 694. )2 De la Melena testified 
that she may have looked at the survey when she received it in 
1978, but did not recognize the discrepancy in the fence line. 
(See de la Melena depo. at 12, Exhibit "5".) 
Shortly after the de la Melena lot was conveyed to de la 
Melena and her now deceased husband, they built a home and 
landscaped the property. On the disputed strip of property, they 
planted raspberries, installed a small wire fence to support the 
2The survey also shows that a fence running east and west on the de la Melena lot and 
a garage on the Clarence Sanders1 property encroaches approximately nine feet into the 
de le Melena lot. (See Exhibit "2" and R. 356.) 
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berries, planted fruit-bearing bushes, fruit trees and a lawn. 
They also installed a sprinkling system on the disputed strip, 
(See de la Melena depo. at 10 and 16-18, Exhibit "5".) 
Neither the Hockings nor any previous owners of the Hocking 
lot ever cultivated, irrigated, farmed, manicured or improved in 
any way the disputed strip of property. (R. 674-675.) Martin 
Hocking has annually repaired the chain-link fence for mule deer 
damage. The Hockings also use the fence as a trellis and regularly 
trim the growth on the fence. In 1978, Martin Hocking repaired the 
damage to the fence caused by the builders of de la Melenafs home. 
In 1989, the Hockings extended the height of the fence. (R. 676-
677. ) 
After negotiations had failed between the parties for the 
Hockings to purchase the vacant west portion of the de la Melena 
lot, the Hockings on October 10, 1989, thirty-six years after the 
chain-link fence was installed, notified de la Melena that they 
were revoking what they described as their "tacit license" allowing 
her to use the disputed strip of property. (R. 696. ) On September 
27, 1990, the Hockings filed suit against de la Melena to quiet 
title to the disputed strip of property. (R. 1-10.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Hockings' contention that the warranty deeds, the 1969 
survey received by the Hockings, and the 1978 survey ordered by 
Tingey constitutes prima facie evidence that there was no mutual 
acquiescence in the long-standing chain-link fence as a boundary 
reflects a misunderstanding of the boundary by acquiescence doc-
trine. There is no authority whatsoever for the Hockings' position 
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that notice of a "true boundary line11 in the fixing of a fence line 
is prima facie evidence of a lack of mutual acquiescence. 
Moreover, the Utah Supreme Court in Staker v. Ainsworth, 785 
P. 2d 417 (Utah 1990) completely eradicated uncertainty as a factor 
from the boundary by acquiescence doctrine. Whether a boundary was 
uncertain or in doubt at the time that it was acquiesced in, or 
whether the boundary was known and certain, is irrelevant to the 
doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. Uncertainty is now only a 
factor in the boundary by agreement doctrine. Staker's rejection 
of the confusing intermingling of these doctrines accords with well 
reasoned authority that refute the notion that certainty of the 
proper line precludes mutual acquiescence in boundary by acquies-
cence cases. Moreover, a presumption, uncontroverted by a showing 
of certainty, that any dispute over the boundary line has been 
reconciled promotes the boundary by acquiescence doctrine's policy 
to preclude litigious boundary disagreements that bear ill will 
towards neighbors and clog the court dockets. 
Even if uncertainty were still a factor in the boundary by 
acquiescence doctrine, the Hockings fail to designate specific 
genuine issues of material fact to controvert the presumption of 
acquiescence in this case. The undisputed material facts in this 
case establish as a matter of law that there was mutual acquies-
cence in the fence line for a sufficient period of time. 
Finally, equitable principles support summary judgment for de 
la Melena. For at least thirty-six years, the owners of the 
Hocking and de la Melena lots have relied on the fence as the true 
and proper boundary. It would be grossly unfair at this point and 
time to consider the fence as anything but a fixed boundary line. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR AS A MATTER OF LAW 
IN DETERMINING THAT THERE WAS MUTUAL ACQUIESCENCE 
IN THE LONG-STANDING FENCE LINE AS A BOUNDARY. 
The Hockings erroneously argue that the warranty deeds, the 
1969 survey received by the Hockings, and the 1978 survey ordered 
by Tingey constitute "prima facie evidence" that there was no 
mutual acquiescence in the long-standing fence line as a boundary. 
The Hockings are flatly wrong. The warranty deeds and surveys in 
this case do not constitute "prima facie" evidence of a lack of 
mutual acquiescence. Nor does such evidence controvert the trial 
courtfs finding that as a matter of law there was mutual acquies-
cence in the fence as a boundary. 
In Staker v. Ainsworth, 785 P. 2d 417 (Utah 1990), the Supreme 
Court affirmed a trial court's summary judgment employing the 
doctrine of boundary by acquiescence to establish fence lines as 
property boundary lines, rather than those established by record 
title. The court reaffirmed that the doctrine by acquiescence 
includes only four factors: 
1. Occupation up to a visible line marked by 
monuments, fences, or buildings; 
2. Mutual acquiescence in the line as a boundary; 
3. For a long period of time; and 
4. By adjoining landowners. 
Id. at 420. 
The trial court in this case held that based on the evidence 
proffered by the parties it was uncontroverted that these four fac-
tors were met by de la Melena. On appeal, the Hockings concede 
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that each factor was met by de la Melena, except for mutual acqui-
escence. 
A. Because a Sufficient Period of Time had Already Run 
for Acquiescence, Evidence of the 1978 Survey is 
Academic. 
In arguments I-III, the Hockings contend that mutual acquies-
cence ceased in 1978, upon the taking of a survey ordered by 
William Tingey. The Hockings are mistaken. Acquiescence continued 
from the erection of the chain-link fence in 1953 until 1989, when 
the Hockings first notified de la Melena of a boundary dispute. 
However, because twenty-five years from the erection of the chain-
line fence in 1953 had passed before Tingey ordered the 1978 
survey, it is unnecessary for this Court to determine whether 
mutual acquiescence ceased upon the taking of the 1978 survey. 
Staker held that twenty-years was a sufficient period of time to 
establish the third element in boundary by acquiescence, although 
a lesser prescriptive period would be appropriate under unusual 
circumstances. Ld. at 420. Even if the fence were installed in 
1956, as the Hockings allege in their statement of facts, twenty-
two years would have passed before the 1978 survey, which is still 
a sufficient time to establish boundary by acquiescence. Whatever 
significance the Hockings attach to the 1978 survey and their 
allegation the fence was erected in 1956, is irrelevant to the 
application of the boundary by acquiescence doctrine in this case. 
B. Staker v. Ainsworth Completely Eradicated Factor of 
Uncertainty From Boundary by Acquiescence Doctrine. 
The Hockings! remaining argument that the warranty deeds and 
their 1969 survey constitute prima facie evidence of a lack of 
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mutual acquiescence misconstrues the law. There is no authority 
that certainty or knowledge in a boundary line constitutes prima 
facie evidence of a lack of mutual acquiescence. Moreover, it is 
implicit in Staker v. Ainsworth that uncertainty is no longer a 
factor in the boundary by acquiescence test. 
1. Staker Recognized Clear Distinction Between 
Doctrines of Boundary by Acquiescence and 
Boundary by Agreement, 
The Hockings* tortured "prima facie" theory is premised on a 
confusing intermingling of the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence 
with that of boundary by agreement.3 Holding that there* is a clear 
distinction between these two theories, Staker overturned Halladay 
v. Cluff, 685 P.2d 500 (Utah 1984), rev'd 785 P.2d 417 (1990), 
which required that the claimant prove objective uncertainty as to 
the actual location of the property line. 
Halladay1s requirement of objective uncertainty was the result 
of the confusion between the separate doctrines of boundary by 
agreement and acquiescence. Originally, uncertainty or dispute was 
required only for boundary by agreement. Halladay, 685 P. 2d at 
503. In 1928, however, the supreme court in Tripp v. Bagley, 784 
Utah 57, 276 P.2d 912 (1928), cited by Halladay as support for its 
imposition of the objective uncertainty requirement, begin to refer 
to uncertainty or dispute as an essential ingredient for boundary 
3Staker noted that boundary by agreement is premised on a contractual theory and 
requires: "(1) an agreement, (2) between adjoining landowners, (3) settling a boundary that 
was uncertain or in dispute, and (4) executed by actual location of a boundary line." Id. 
at 423 n.4 (quoting Backman, The Lawf of Practical Location of Boundaries and the Need 
for an Adverse Possession Remedy, 1986 B.Y.U.L.Rev. 957, 965-82 (emphasis added)). 
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by acquiescence-4 Tripp held the doctrine of boundary by acquies-
cence to be not applicable because the evidence affirmatively 
demonstrated that when the boundary fence was erected, the parties 
knew that it was not on the true line, and further, they could not 
have believed it to be on the true line since the true line was 
straight north and south along a section line, and the boundary 
fence had sharp angle turns in it. Id. As Staker noted, however, 
Tripp involved a parol agreement and therefore should not have been 
decided as a boundary by acquiescence case. Id. at 422-23. 
Staker did not simply obviate the burden of proving objective 
uncertainty on the party relying on the boundary by acquiescence 
doctrine. The court repudiated the out-dated and sterile notion, 
initially developed in Tripp, and now latched onto by the Hockings, 
that the absence of uncertainty in fixing the boundary proves there 
was no acquiescence between the parties. Criticizing the language 
in Tripp that long served as the basis for recognizing uncertainty 
as an element of boundary by acquiescence cases, Staker stated: 
Cases which followed Tripp seized upon this 
dicta, which we now deem to be unfortunate in 
its impact, and intermittently began to refer 
to a showing of uncertainty or dispute in a 
boundary by acquiescence context. 
4In Wood v. Myrup, 681 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah 1984), which the Hockings cite as 
controlling authority in this appeal, the element of uncertainty appears to have served as 
a basis for the Supreme Courtfs decision. Wood was authored by Justice Oaks just prior to 
his opinion in Halladay v. Cluff, and in light of Staker, is no longer controlling authority 
that certainty in a deed line controverts as a matter of law the presumption of boundary 
by acquiescence. 
5Tripp was cited in 12 AmJur.2d Boundaries, § 85 (1964) as an exception to the rule that 
n[t]he cases approving the doctrine of acquiescence generally do not differentiate between 
cases where the boundary was uncertain or in doubt at the time that it was acquiesced in 
and in cases where it was known and certain." 
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Id. at 422.6 Staker makes clear that uncertainty is a factor in 
boundary by agreement and not of boundary by acquiescence. Uncer-
tainty and dispute are important in boundary by agreement cases to 
overcome a statute of frauds bar to an oral agreement. Id. at 423. 
These elements, however, have no relevance whatsoever to a boundary 
by acquiescence analysis. 
Stakerfs rejection of the intermingling of the doctrine of 
boundary by acquiescence with the boundary by agreement doctrine 
accords with courts and commentators who refute the notion that 
certainty of the original line precludes mutual acquiescence in 
boundary by acquiescence cases. 
Other courts, however, recognizing the doc-
trine of boundary by agreement as distinct 
from that of boundary from acquiescence de-
clare that from acquiescence to the statutory 
period arises as a direct and conclusive 
inference, not of an agreement, but that the 
boundary acquiesced in is actually the true 
boundary, not to be controverted by evidence 
and unaffected i?~; the existence or non-exis-
tence of a disp.ze or uncertainty concerning 
the original line. 
7 A.L.R. 4th, Fence as Factor in Fixing a Boundary Line, 1f 2[a] 
(1981) (emphasis added). 
6The following language in Tripp was specifically criticized by Staker: 
[0]ne of the requisites necessary to the establishment of a 
boundary line other than the true boundary line between 
adjoining landowners by oral agreement or acquiescence . . . is 
that the location of the true boundary sought to be thus 
established is or has been uncertain or in dispute. 
It thus becomes of controlling importance to determine whether 
two adjacent landowners may establish a boundary line between 
their lands by oral agreement or by acquiescence for a long 
period of time, when there is no uncertainty as to the location 
of the true boundary line. . . . 
Staker, 785 P.2d at 422 (quoting Tripp, 74 Utah at 67 k 69, 276 P. at 916 & 917) 
(citations omitted in first quote) (emphasis included in Staker). 
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Nor does the fact that the Hockings were privy to a survey in 
1969 that revealed a discrepancy between the fence line and the 
deed line controvert the mutual acquiescence in this case. Staker 
also expressly discarded the notion rooted in Tripp and articulated 
in Halladay that a claimant is precluded from showing mutual 
acquiescence if the claimant knew or had reason to know the true 
location of the boundary during the period of acquiescence. 
Staker repudiated the second sentence, as well as the first 
sentence in the following language in Halladay: 
Unless it is shown that during the period of 
acquiescence there was objectively measurable 
circumstance in record title or in the reason-
ably survey information (or other technique by 
which record title information was located on 
the grounds) that would have prevented a 
landowner, as a practical matter, from being 
reasonably certain about the true location of 
the boundary. By the same token, a claimant 
cannot assert boundary by acquiescence if he 
or his predecessors in title had reason to 
know the true location of the boundary during 
the period of acquiescence. 
Staker, 785 P.2d 421 (quoting Halladay, 685 P.2d at 505) (emphasis 
added).7 Staker noted that these two sentences mean "there must 
'Justice Howe in Halladay v. Cluff concurred with the second sentence quoted above 
on the limited grounds that both parties had access to a survey which indicated that they 
did own to the fence to which they claimed. Id. at 513. Although he suggested that 
perhaps a reasonable standard could be used in cases "where the discrepancy was apparent 
and the acquiescence was blindly indulged in," he warned that "we must not expect too 
much from the rule since being familiar with the legal description of one's property and 
locating that description on the land are two entirely different things. That is why surveys 
are made." Id. 
Even if Justice Howefs suggested approach had been followed by Staker, the 
Hockings still lose on summary judgment. Both parties did not have access to a survey 
indicating that they did not own to the fence. The Tingeys were not privy to a survey until 
1978, well after the 20 year prescribed period for mutual acquiescence. Moreover, there 
is no issue of fact that the acquiescence was blindly indulged in. The Tingeys had no reason 
to know that the fence was not on a true line. As Justice Howe noted: 
The rule would serve well in instances like Tripp v. Bagley, 
supra, where an old fence line had several angle turns in it 
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have been a particular form of dispute, " a concept that Staker 
disparages as inconsistent with the boundary by acquiescence 
doctrine. Id. The fact that the Hockings are not even claimants 
in this case, compounded with their failure to notify de la Melena 
and her predecessors in interest of a "boundary problem" the 
Hockings allegedly knew about in 1969, further compels a rejection 
of the Hockings1 prima facie argument. Adoption of the Hocking 
position would undermine Staker' s well-reasoned analysis and, as 
developed later in this brief, would be patently unfair. 
2. Facts In Staker v. Ainsworth Are Compelling 
That Notice To Landowners Of A "True Boundary 
Line" Does Not As A Matter Of Law Controvert 
Acquiescence In A Fence Line As A Boundary, 
Staker concluded there was mutual acquiescence in the fence 
line as a boundary, despite the undisputed facts before the court 
that the landowners had notice through surveys that the fence line 
was not in accordance with the deed line. A survey taken in 1953 
or 1956 showed that the true boundary line between the Teeples, 
predecessors in interest to the Maxfield (non-claimant/appellant) 
property, and Ainsworth (claimant/appellee) was approximately 80 
feet south of the existing fence line. In 1956, notwithstanding 
this discrepancy, Teeples reconstructed the fence on the same 
whereas the true line was straight north and south along the 
section line; and Madsen v. Clegg, supra, where the boundary 
fence ran on a straight line, whereas the deed lines of both 
parties provide angle turns in them. In both cases the landown-
er had reason to note that the fence was not on a true line. 
Id. at 513-14. In this case, not only did Tingey not have access to a survey, the fence line 
and the true line run parallel and are not interrupted by abrupt turns. Simply put, there 
is no noticeable discrepancy between the location of the fence line and Tingey1 s 1947 
warranty deed. See Universal Inv. Corp. v. Kingsbury, 26 Utah 2d 35, 484 P.2d 173 (1971). 
Even if this Court were to follow Justice Howe!s recommendation, the Hockings would still 
fail to prevail against the trial court !s summary judgment. 
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boundary line as the previous fence shortly after the original 
fence was destroyed in a storm, (See Brief for Appellee Ainsworth 
at 3, 11, and 19 & Brief for Appellee Staker at 17, attached to 
record at R. 700-703, 705.) In 1972, Maxfield had a survey taken 
in connection with his purchase of his property. The survey again 
revealed the difference of approximately 75 feet between the legal 
description and the fence line. (See Brief for Appellant Maxfield 
at 18 & Brief for Appellee Staker at 4, attached to record at R. 
708, 710-) In 1979, the Stakers had a survey performed which indi-
cated a discrepancy of about 80 feet between the fence lines and 
the record title boundary lines on both sides of the property. 
Staker, 785 P. 2d at 419. Finally, in 1981, Ainsworth had his 
property surveyed and also found a similar discrepancy. Id. 
The surveys taken in 1953 or 1956, 1972, 1979 and 1981 serving 
notice to the landowners that the fence line was not the "true 
boundary line" were immaterial to the question in Staker of whether 
there was mutual acquiescence. Despite this abundance of previous 
survey information available to the landowners, Staker expressly 
noted that acquiescence ceased only in 1985 when the first claim 
regarding the dispute was filed. The court held as a matter of law 
that the longstanding fence line was the boundary between the 
adjoining landowners. Boundary by acquiescence was established 
under facts demonstrating that the adjoining landowners acted in a 
manner consistent with the belief that the fence line was the 
boundary, irrespective of the various landowners1 surveys giving 
the parties notice that the fence line was not on the deed lines. 
Id. at 420-21. 
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3. Presumption Of Acquiescence Uncontroverted By 
Certainty Of Deed Line Promotes Policy Under-
lying Boundary By Acquiescence Doctrine. 
Finally, a presumption, uncontroverted by a showing of cer-
tainty, that any dispute over the boundary line has been reconciled 
accords with the boundary by acquiescence doctrine's policy to pre-
clude litigious boundary disagreements that bear ill will towards 
neighbors and clog the court dockets. Staker states: 
The doctrine of boundary by acquiescence 
derives from realization, ancient in our law, 
that peace and good order of society is [sic] 
best served by leaving at rest possible dis-
putes over long established boundaries. Its 
essence is that where there has been any type 
of a recognizable physical boundary, which has 
been accepted as such for a long period of 
time, it should be presumed that any dispute 
or disagreement over the boundary has been 
reconciled in some manner. 
Id. at 423 (quoting Baum v. Defa, 525 P.2d 725, 726 (Utah 1974)). 
Eliminating the factor of "uncertainty" from the boundary by 
acquiescence doctrine simplifies the application of the doctrine 
and is fair. Landowners may rely on recognizable boundary lines in 
existence for twenty plus years without fear that an undisclosed 
survey taken by an adjoining landowner will controvert the 
otherwise mutual acquiescence between the parties. Twenty years is 
long enough for a party adverse to acquiescence to note their 
objection to a fence line as the boundary, especially when the 
parties have expended reliable time and resources in developing 
their property in reliance on the recognized boundary line. 
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II. EVEN IF UNCERTAINTY WERE STILL A FACTOR IN 
BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE ANALYSIS, HOCKINGS FAIL 
TO DESIGNATE SPECIFIC GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL 
FACT TO CONTROVERT PRESUMPTION OF ACQUIESCENCE. 
As Staker noted, a small line of cases following Tripp, 
including Wright v. Clissold, 521 P.2d 1224 (Utah 1974), cited to 
by the Hockings, unfortunately referred to uncertainty in a 
boundary by acquiescence context. _Id. at 422. Wright stated that 
lack of uncertainty or dispute at the time the fence was erected 
could be shown as a defense by the party resisting boundary by 
acquiescence. See also Universal Inv. Corp. v. Kingsbury, 26 Utah 
2d 35, 484 P. 2d 173 (1971).8 These cases held that the burden of 
proof is upon the person asserting the defense. Once the four 
elements of boundary by acquiescence are established, the Court is 
required to presume the existence of a binding agreement unless the 
party who assails it proves by competent evidence that there was 
actually no agreement between the adjoining landowners or there 
could not have been a proper agreement. Wright, 521 P.2d at 1226. 
8
 The Hockings reliance in their brief on both Wright and Fuoco v. Williams, 18 Utah 
2d 282, 421 P.2d 944 (1966) is misplaced. Both decisions were grounded on the affirmative 
defense that the boundary line was set for a purpose other than setting a boundary. Wright 
noted that the fence was erected not to locate a boundary which was uncertain, but simply 
to contain cattle and thus the parties could not acquiescence in the fence as a boundary. 
Id. at 1227. The language in Fuoco cited by the Hockings reaffirms that this principle. The 
court held that an irrigation ditch, which was located in an area overgrown with weeds, and 
which had to be periodically reestablished by plowing did not have the visibility and 
persistency of placement to constitute a boundary. Id. at 947. 
Neither Wright nor Fuoco are applicable to this appeal. There is no material factual 
dispute that the chain-link fence in this case establishes a clear and visible boundary line. 
The fence was not constructed to keep out livestock, but to serve as a boundary between 
the Hocking and de la Melena lots. The real issue the Hockings raise is not whether the 
fence constitutes a clear and viable boundary between residential lots, but whether the 
parties acquiesced in that boundary. 
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One of the four mentioned defenses included "the absence of a 
dispute or uncertainty in fixing the boundary." Id.9 
It is implicit in Staker that a showing of the absence of 
uncertainty is no longer a defense that will contradict the 
presumption of mutual acquiescence. The language and logic in 
Staker repudiate the factor of uncertainty altogether in a boundary 
by acquiescence context. 
However, even if a showing of the absence of uncertainty were 
still a viable defense in a boundary by acquiescence case, the 
Hockings fail to meet their burden in designating specific facts 
showing such an absence. In this case the evidence is uncontro-
verted that the fence line was fixed pursuant to an agreement 
between the parties1 predecessors in interest, notwithstanding a 
discrepancy the between Milt Green's 1953 survey and the warranty 
deeds. If the parties did not dispute the boundary line, the 
evidence is at least clear that the proper boundary was uncertain. 
Tingey's awareness that he had purchased in 1947 100 feet from 
north to south is not a material fact. Dispositive on this point 
is Universal Inv. Corp. v. Kingsbury, 26 Utah 2d 35, 484 P.2d 173 
(1971). In 1940, the parties had rebuilt a 50-year old fence 
dividing lots on the same line as the old fence. The ne*w fence was 
located approximately five feet south of the line described in the 
property owner's deeds. Reversing the trial court and finding 
mutual acquiescence, the supreme court held that the non-claimant 
9The other three defenses that Wright noted would rebut the presumption of a binding 
agreement, included: (1) no parties available to make an agreement (i.e., sole ownership of 
the property with the existing line which was later transferred in tracts to two or more 
other persons; (2) the line was set for a purpose other than setting a boundary; used in and 
(3) mistake or inadvertence in locating the boundary on facts that would warrant relief in 
equity. Id. at 1226. 
18 
defendant did not meet his burden in showing there was no uncer-
tainty as to the true boundary line. Notably, the fact that 
plaintiff knew that he was aware that his deed specified 27 1/2 
feet fronting from the property was insufficient to rebut the 
presumption of acquiescence. Plaintiff testified that he always 
considered the fence to be the boundary. Id. at 174. 
Similarly, in this case, the Hockings advance no other facts 
to show that the parties had notice when the fence line was fixed 
except for the immaterial fact that Tingey was aware he had 
purchased 100 feet fronting the property. Tingey testified 
unequivocally that he never marked off the 100 feet and regarded 
the fence line to be the boundary between his property and the 
Hocking lot. With no other evidence to support their contention, 
the Hockings simply fail to raise a material fact that could rebut 
the presumption of acquiescence.10 
There is no authority whatsoever for the notion the Hockings 
advance that notice of a "true boundary line" in the fixing of a 
fence line is prima facie evidence of a lack of mutual acquies-
cence. Nor is showing an absence of uncertainty in such a context 
a viable affirmative defense following the Staker decision. Even 
The Hockings cite Low v. Bonacci, 788 P.2d 512 (Utah 1990) for the proposition that 
Tingeyfs knowledge that he purchased 100 feet from the front of de la Melena!s lot 
somehow prevents mutual acquiescence in this case. The facts recited in the Low opinion 
are sparse, but based on what little is disclosed, Low is clearly distinguishable from this 
case. Low found that Bonacci did not meet his burden in showing mutual acquiescence in 
the fence line as the boundary between his property and appellee Colletts1 property. 
Apparently, an existing boundary was established in 1964 by a condemnation action in which 
the Colletts were paid by the State for the condemned portion of the property. This Court 
held that this action established acquiescence in the meets and bounds description, not in 
the fence line. Id. at 513. There has been no similar action in this case that established 
clear boundary lines. The evidence is conclusive that the parties have acquiesced in the 
fence line as the true boundary, not the deed line or a line created by a previous legal 
action. 
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if the affirmative defense still existed, the Hockings have failed 
to meet their burden and show a genuine issue of material fact that 
there was an absence of uncertainty in the fixing of the fence 
line, 
III. THE UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS ESTABLISH 
THAT THERE WAS MUTUAL ACQUIESCENCE IN THE 
FENCE LINE FOR A SUFFICIENT PERIOD OF TIME, 
The only so-called "factual dispute" the Hockings raise on 
appeal is that the 1953 survey Milt Green testified building the 
fence pursuant to in sworn affidavit and deposition has not been 
produced. That de la Melena was unsuccessful in obtaining the 
survey is not surprising given the date of the survey, and the fact 
that Green had no need to keep the survey after 1963 when he sold 
the Hocking parcel to the Madsens. Even if Green had not built the 
fence pursuant to a survey, the fact would be immaterial since 
uncertainty is no longer an element or factor in boundary by 
acquiescence cases and, even if it were, the absence of a survey 
does not alone controvert the presumption of uncertainty. 
The facts are uncontroverted in this case that there has been 
mutual acquiescence in the fence line as a boundary. The actions 
of the adjoining landowners demonstrate unquestionably a belief 
that the fence line was the true and proper boundary. The material 
facts relevant to this factor are substantially similar to those in 
Staker. Like Staker, in this case there is no indication in the 
record that the Hockings, de la Melena or any predecessor in 
interest to the two parcels behaved in a fashion inconsistent with 
the belief that the fence line was a boundary. The owners of both 
the Hockings and de la Melena lots occupied houses, constructed 
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buildings, farmed and irrigated only within their respective fenced 
areas. 
Aside from simply developing the lots within the boundaries 
established by the fence line, the record is replete with undisput-
ed evidence that the owners of the parcels openly regarded the 
fence line as the true and proper boundary. The Hockings have 
carefully maintained the fence, made several repairs and improve-
ments and have even extended the height of the fence several feet. 
Also, like in Staker, there has never been any indication or 
notification by either party of a disagreement of the fence line as 
the boundary until the Hockings notified de la Melena in 1989 of a 
dispute. The undisputed facts conclusively prove that from 1953 to 
1989, a period of thirty-six years, the owners of the two parcels 
never discussed, notified or behaved in any way as to indicate a 
disagreement with the fence line as the boundary.11 
IV. EQUITABLE PRINCIPLES SUPPORT 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR DE LA MELENA. 
Not only is this case factually on point with Staker v. 
Ainsworth, but the equities in this case support a judgment in 
favor of de la Melena as a matter of law. The Utah Supreme Court 
has held that even where an affirmative defense is advanced to 
rebut the presumption of mutual acquiescence, the equities in the 
case and the public policies of eliminating litigious lawsuits may 
compel a finding of acquiescence, especially where a party ignored 
nThe Utah Supreme Court also applied the objective test in determining whether 
adjoining owners acquiesced in a line as a boundary in Lane v. Walker, 29 Utah 2d 119, 505 
P.2d 1199 (1973). 
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and essentially consented to the boundary. King v. Fronk, 14 Utah 
2d 135, 378 P.2d 893, 895 n.5 (1963). 
It is suggested that even where mistake is 
shown, there might be a case where the doc-
trine, based on principle of repose and elimi-
nation of litigious lawsuits may hurdle ci 
mistake in the interest of settling bound-
aries. Each case must be viewed in the light 
of its own facts, equity and public policy. 
One might be mistaken, but shown to have 
ignored and consented to the boundary. 
Id. 
The facts in this case compel a finding of mutual acquies-
cence. For at least thirty-six years, the owners of the Hockings 
and de la Melena lots have relied on the fence erected by the 
Hockings1 predecessor in interest as the true and proper boundary. 
It would be grossly unfair at this point in time, some thirty-six 
years later, to consider the fence as anything but a fixed boundary 
line, especially in light of the reliance of the property owners in 
developing their property consonant with the fence as a boundary 
line. Moving the fence would disrupt an established sprinkling 
system, causing lines to be moved and result in expenses for the 
reconstruction of a lengthy fence. Moreover, all the Hockings 
stand to lose by maintaining the fence line is a strip of land they 
have never used, or indicated a desire to use. 
IV. HOCKINGS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO COSTS. 
De la Melena!s counsel is reluctant to dignify with a response 
the Hockings' allegation that de la Melena?s counsel have violated 
professional rules of conduct. Their allegation, not taken lightly 
by de la Melena's counsel, is offensive, scandalous and bizarre. 
22 
A party is obviously never obligated to another party to sue that 
party. 
Appellee recognizes the frustration the Hockings have had with 
a system they have not fully understood as pro se advocates, but 
accusing counsel of unethical conduct with reckless abandon is 
hardly justified. 
CONCLUSION 
The Hockings have failed to state any grounds that the trial 
court erred in its summary judgment for de la Melena. Accordingly, 
the trial court's order should be affirmed in all respects. 
DATED this V" day of March, 1992. 
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS 
MICHAEL T. ROBERTS 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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Thirteenth Floor, 201 South Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utah and 
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Martin L. and Judith C. Hocking 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH 
MARTIN 
vs. 
MERLYN 
L. HOCKING, et al., ] 
Plaintiffs, ] 
TINGEY ROBERTS, et al., ] 
Defendants. ; 
> RULING ON MOTIONS 
| FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
) Civil No. 900748579 
Both the plaintiff and defendant filed motions for summary 
judgment. The motions were heard on September 3, 1991, with the 
plaintiff appearing pro se and the defendant represented by 
Michael T. Roberts. After oral argument the Court took the 
motions under advisement. 
The defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted. 
There is no genuine issue of material fact. 
Milton C. Green was a previous owner of the Hockings' 
property, and, in 1953, pursuant to a survey, erected a 
chain-link fence that still serves as a boundary between what is 
now the Hocking and de la Melena lots. William Tingey owned de 
la Melena's property from 1947 to 1978. Tingey cultivated, 
irrigated and farmed the de la Melena lot and acquiesced in the 
1953 chain-link fence as a boundary line between the two 
parcels. Milton C. Green and William Tingey agreed that the 
fence would constitute a boundary between their property. Both 
plaintiffs and defendants obtained surveys over the years and 
each learned at some point in time that the fence line and the 
legal title line was 12 feet off. The discrepancy was not 
discussed until October 10, 1989, when the plaintiffs notified 
the defendants they were claiming the disputed 12 feet. 
The memorandum of the parties clearly set out the 
controlling case law that would permit this Court to rule in the 
defendant's favor, especially in a recent Utah Supreme Court 
ruling, Staker v. Ainsworth, 785P.2d 417, 420 (Utah 1990). In 
Staker, the Court indicated that a fence relied upon as a 
boundary is superior over the boundary of record so long as the 
elements of boundary by acquiescence are in place. Id. The 
elements of boundary by acquiescence are: (1) occupation up to 
a visible line marked by monuments, fences, or building; (2) 
mutual acquiescence in the line as a boundary; (3) for a long 
period of time (20 years as the minimum, generally) ; and (4) by 
adjoining landowners. Id. (citing Goodman v. Wilkinson, 629 
P.2d 447, 448 (Utah 1981). Applying the boundary by 
acquiescence elements to the instant case, we find that from 
1953, a fence erected by the plaintiffs7 predecessors in 
interest was relied upon by plaintiffs' predecessors in 
interest, the plaintiffs, the defendants' predecessor in 
interest, and the defendant up until 1989. The adjoining 
landowers, Roberts' father and Green to begin with and 
eventually the Hockings and Roberts, relied on the fence to 
demarcate their property for more than 35 years. An affidavit 
by Green indicates that an earlier fence separated the property 
at the same spot as the one installed by Green in 1953. Thus, 
defendants as a matter of law are entitled to the land separated 
by the fenced boundary rather than the titles of record 
according to the common law doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. 
The plaintiffs do not agree with the Court's summary of 
facts or law. Plaintiffs maintain that earlier surveys that 
they (1969) and the defendant (1978) had ordered somehow 
indicate that there was no mutual acquiescence. However, 
plaintiffs provide no proof that such surveys raised the 
boundary issue when drawn up. It was not until 1989 that the 
plaintiffs realized a fence line in effect for more than 30 
years was off by 12 feet. The plaintiffs simply have no legal 
or factual ground on which to premise any motion of summary 
judgment. Accordingly, summary judgment in favor of the 
defendant seems required according to Utah law. 
The plaintiffs7 motion seeking reimbursement for attorney's 
and paralegals fees is denied. If the plaintiffs feel they have 
a cause of action against their former attorney the remedy is to 
file an action against him. 
The defendants are directed to draw a formal order based 
upon this ruling. 
Dated September 25, 1991. 
BY THE COURT: 
JudgeV^7 
Certificate of Mailing: 
This is to certify that the undersigned mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Ruling to: 
Martin L. Hocking Michael T. Roberts 
Judith C. Hocking First Interstate Plaza 
349 East Center Street 170 South Main Street 
Centerville, UT 84014 SLC, UT 84101-1605 
Dated this <P^5^n day of September 1991. 
/2 a^7 
Deputy Cl{^ rk 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MARTIN L. HOCKINGS, and 
JUDITH C. HOCKINGS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MERLYN TINGY ROBERTS, n/d/k 
MERLYN TINGY DE LA MELENA, 
Defendant. 
Case No. 900748579 
DEPOSITION UPON ORAL EXAMINATION OF: 
WILLIAM TINGY 
TAKEN AT: 243 East 400 South, #200, Salt Lake City, Utah 
DATE: December 14, 1990 
REPORTED BY: Jody Edwards, CSR 
^ 
CAPITOL 
REPORTERS 
175 South Main. #510 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84 i l l 
(801)363-7939 /f 
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A Eighty-one. 
Q And are you familiar with the property that is the 
subject of this lawsuit? 
A Yes. 
Q And just for the record, this is the property which 
is currently owned by your daughter, Merlyn Roberts de la 
Melena? 
A Yes. 
Q Is that correct? 
A Yes. 
Q At one time that property was owned by yourself, do 
you recall that? 
A Yes. 
Q Can you tell me when you first purchased the lot in 
question? 
A November the 19th, 1947. 
Q And from whom did you purchase that property? 
A William Evans. 
Q Do you recall the dimensions of that lot when you 
bought it? 
A Yes, to this extent, he said, I will sell you 100 
feet from north to south. 
Q Okay. What did you do with the lot when you bought 
it from Mr. Evans? 
A Cleaned some dead trees and rocks off and started — 
JODY EDWARDS — CAPITOL REPORTERS 
1 and farmed it. 
2 Q And what type of agriculture did you farm on that? 
3 A Well, produce; squash, beans. 
4 MRS. TINGY: Peas. 
5 THE WITNESS: Peas, that type of produce. 
6 Q (BY MR. HUNT) Okay. And so it was your 
7 understanding when you bought the lot that you only had 100 
8 feet from north to south? 
9 A Correct. 
10 Q Okay. Now, aft'er you bought the lot from Mr. Evans, 
11 you changed the title or the ownership of the lot to Tingy 
12 Real Estate, do you recall that? 
13 A It was in our name. You mean when we — other 
14 ground that we — 
15 Q No. Well, I know you've owned other parcels. 
16 A Okay. August the 8th, 1963, for — as tenant in 
17 common for estate planning. 
18 Q Okay. Who did you change the title to at that time, 
19 Mr. Tingy, just to yourselves? 
20 A Yes, we were — 
21 Q Okay. And at some point subsequent, after 1963, did 
22 you change it to a corporation? 
23 A In December — yes, December the 20th, 1971 we 
24 turned it to Tingy Real Estate, Incorporated. 
25 Q Okay. And then after that you sold it or conveyed 
JODY EDWARDS — CAPITOL REPORTERS 
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1 A Yes. 
2 Q Several years ago? 
3 A Yes, after we had the property. 
4 Q Thatfs correct. 
5 A Yes. 
6 Q All right. And did you have any idea of where the 
7 fence was placed in relationship to the boundary on your lot? 
8 A I did not. I was never asked to participate with 
9 the fence, financially or any other way, I never was. 
10 Q Was there a fence between that property before this 
11 chain link fence was built? 
12 A No, there was not. Wil Evans owned the whole half a 
13 block there. 
14 Q Okay. 
15 A He owned their lot and also the rock house out on 
16 the corner. 
17 Q How did you farm that ground, then? How did you 
18 know where to farm when you were farming it? And you started 
19 that in 1947. How far did you plow and irrigate? 
2 0 A Well, we didn't have a survey then, I imagine we 
21 just decided on a — I just plowed the same area every year. 
22 Q And so you went back 100 feet and stopped? 
23 A Yes, that's right. 
24 Q Okay. Other than just your plowing and your 
25 irrigating, there was no differentiation between the north 
JODY EDWARDS — CAPITOL REPORTERS 
12 
side of that block and the south side, then? 
A No. 
Q I see. And so the first fence to come up was the 
chain link fence? 
A Correct, yes. 
Q Did you notice that it did not correspond with the 
place that you were plowing and irrigating? 
A You're referring to this (indicating)? 
Q I am. 
A No, I did not. In fact, I did not know that there 
was a discrepancy until this came up. I have to admit that 
I — maybe I should have done, but I did not know that there 
was a discrepancy on the line, property line, until this came 
up a few years ago. 
Q When's the first time you recall hearing about the 
fact that the fence wasn't on the property line? 
A I can't tell you the date? When did you make the 
first request? 
Q The record needs to understand, you're looking at 
the Hockings and asking the Hockings? 
A Yes. Maybe they could give me a — 
Q Maybe I can rephrase the question so we can keep it 
just you testifying instead of the Hockings? 
A Oh, all right. 
Q What you're saying to me is that you didn't know 
JODY EDWARDS — CAPITOL REPORTERS 
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1 about the discrepancy in the fence line until — 
2 A I did not. I did not and I paid no attention. I 
3 had no idea that it was not on the correct line. 
4 Q I see. Now, when you sold your property or conveyed 
5 it to your daughter, Merlyn Roberts at that time, didn't you 
6 order a survey? 
7 A Yes. 
8 Q Okay. What you have in front of you is Exhibit 1, 
9 which is the survey. 
10 A Yes. 
11 Q And did you see that survey at that time when 
12 you — 
13 A I assume that I did, but I paid no attention to it 
14 whatsoever. As I remember, the survey was made so that she 
15 could use the lot for collateral to build her home. 
16 Q I see. 
17 A And she used both lots. We understood that there 
18 were two lots there. We always figured there was two lots and 
19 she used both lots as collateral to build the home. 
20 Q All right. But you didn't notice — 
21 A I didn't even keep the survey, we gave it to her. 
22 Q I see. In the course of your using the lot before 
23 you gave it to your daughter, did you plow right up to the 
24 fence? 
25 A Yes, yes, as close as I could get to it to keep the 
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weeds down. 
Q But before the fence was up, you only went back 100 
feet? 
A That's all. 
Q Didn't it strike you as odd that you went back 
another 12 feet further? 
A No, it didn't. I don't remember. I'd have to say 
no to that. 
Q I realize it's a year or two ago and that there's 
been a lot of water under the bridge, or a lot of water down 
the ditch I guess in Utah that's how you say it. A lot of 
water down the ditch, all right. Did you order this survey 
for your daughter? 
A Yes. 
Q You did? 
A Yes. 
Q All right. But you don't recall if you looked at i 
or even saw that the fence line was in the wrong place? 
A I don't recall, no. I did not know that the fence 
line was in the — not on the property line. 
Q And so — 
A I had no reason to know until an objection came up. 
Q Okay. But you did have the survey, it was there? 
A We had the survey — Jack Balling made the survey. 
Q And you never talked about it with him? 
JODY EDWARDS — CAPITOL REPORTERS 
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1 Q All right. Did anybody talk to you before the 
2 Hockings did about the fence being in the wrong place? 
3 A No, no one. 
4 Q No one ever raised that issue? 
5 A No one. 
6 Q Not even the people that owned the property before 
7 the Hockings? 
8 A No, no one. 
9 Q So you have no recollection at all about the fence? 
10 A I do not. And there's been two residents in the 
11 east side since the fence was put up. Do you know what I 
12 mean? 
13 Q Okay. 
14 A There's been two, Reed Pratt lived there and his 
15 wife, and Helmit Wenzel lives there now. That's referring to 
16 the home east of the Hockings. And there was never a 
17 discussion about the property line with those two. 
18 Q Because this strip goes over into the Wenzel 
19 property, too, does it not? 
20 A It does. 
21 Q And the Wenzels have never said anything to you 
22 about it? 
23 A No, they have never mentioned one word to me, not 
24 since our daughter has — 
25 Q They did mention it to her? 
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1 A No, she mentioned to it them. 
2 Q She mentioned it to them, okay. Did anybody mention 
3 it to your family that you're aware of? 
4 A No. 
5 Q Even if they didn't mention it to you? 
6 A Other than Merlyn, no. Absolutely no, no one has 
7 been interested in it. 
8 Q Okay. But you think that somebody may have 
9 mentioned it to Merlyn, but not to you? 
10 A I'm sure the Hockings did. 
11 Q Okay. 
12 (Off the record discussion.) 
13 Q (BY MR. HUNT) Mr. Tingy, when you were farming the 
14 ground initially back in 1948, 1949 and so on until the fence 
15 went up in 1953, did you notice that when you started farming 
16 to the fence that you were getting more production per acre 
17 off of that ground? 
18 A No, I did not. 
19 Q Okay. You see because there's about 30 percent more 
20 on that lot with that additional 12 foot strip, and I wondered 
21 if you noticed that there was any increase in production off 
22 of that property? 
23 A No, I did not. I would assume that I was plowing 
24 right over and that was where the fence is now was the 
25 property line. Do you know what I mean? I assumed that that 
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1 was the line. I don't remember going out ten more feet with 
2 the plow at all. 
3 Q But you must have. It seems to me that you must 
4 have. 
5 A Well, if — 
6 Q If you were going 100 feet and all of the sudden the 
7 fence was 112 feet — 
8 A Unless I was over there before. 
9 Q Oh, now I haven't thought of that? 
10 A It could be. 
11 Q You might have over plowed the original lot, is what 
12 you're saying, because there was no prior fence? 
13 A Well, Evans never established the point. I don't 
14 remember who did, but he never did. He and I, as I remember, 
15 we never did establish the point. And I assume that we 
16 stepped it off, somebody did, and established the 100 feet 
17 back. 
18 Q Okay. And you don't recall one year going 100 feet 
19 and the next year going 112 feet? 
20 A No. 
21 Q And you didn't remember getting a substantial 
22 increase of your crop off that? 
23 A No, when you pick zucchini you don't know whether 
24 you've got 100 or — 
25 Q I'm with you if that's what you had on there. I'm 
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1 sorry, it's been a long week and that's humerus. Okay. 
2 Zucchini is zucchini, isn't it? 
3 A Right. 
4 MR. HUNT: Off the record again. 
5 (Off the record discussion.) 
6 MR. HUNT: I don't any other questions. 
7 MR. ROBERTS: I don't have any questions. 
8 I (Deposition concluded at 3:40 p.m.) 
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A Mm-hm. 
Q Do you follow what I'm talking about there? 
A Yes, I follow that. 
Q Do you know who built that fence line? 
A That fence line that's in there, I built. 
Q You built? 
A Yep. 
Q When did you build that fence line? 
A Well, I can't put it right to the day, but 
it was within a year or two after I --
Q Sometime in 1953 or 1954? 
A Yep. 
Q Was there an existing fence line or base 
where the fence line is that you built that existed 
previously? 
A Right. The property behind me was owned by 
Bill Tingy when I moved there. 
Q Now, the property you're talking about that 
was owned by Bill Tingy, is that now owned by 
Mrs. Merlyn De La Melena, known as Mrs. Roberts to you? 
A Right, to me. And there was an old pioneer 
fence line, you know. Wasn't in great repair, but there 
were sufficient posts at that line that well indicated 
what the line was at that time. And there was some wire 
on it. Wouldn't turn livestock or anything, but you 
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1 could tell at one time it was a good fence, you know. 
2 Q Now, this prior fence line, do you know how 
3 long that fence line had been in existence? 
4 A Oh, good Lord. The way it looked it had to 
5 be 50 years or so old. I'd imagine it was a fence built 
6 by very early settlers in the valley. I've lived around 
7 here all my life, and I know a fence that was built by 
8 pioneers, you know, by looking at it. And so I - I 
9 wouldn't hazard to guess how long, but it was a long, 
10 long time. 
11 Q Did you happen to take a survey prior to 
12 building or repairing this fence line? 
13 A Yes. Therice Duncan had to furnish me a 
14 survey for the title company when -- because of the fact 
15 that there's a lot of defugilty with the east-west lines 
16 in Centerville. And so the title company required a 
17 survey of the property when I bought it from Therice. 
18 Now, I can't remember exactly how close that 
19 back line survey was to that fence, but I know that Bill 
20 and I, which was customary --
21 Q Bill Tingy? 
22 A Bill Tingy. -- looked it over, and the 
23 survey line was within reasonable distance of the old 
24 fence there, you know, a foot or two or whatever. I 
25 can't remember exactly. But there was no question 
either in my mind nor his that that fence line was close 
enough. 
Q For the survey? 
A For the survey. So have at it, he says. 
Q So this survey was ordered by Therice 
Duncan? 
A Right. 
Q Was this prior to your moving into the home, 
prior to purchasing this home? 
A No, not really. It was a week or two after, 
because, you know, I knew Therice, he knew me. We knew 
if there was any problems we'd work them out. 
Q Do you remember who took the survey? 
A I think it was Great Basin. 
Q But you're not sure. 
A Great Basin Engineering, but I'm not right 
positive. But it seems to me that's who it was. 
Q Do you still have a copy of that survey? 
A No. I've been gone from that property for 
years. And I'd imagine Great Basin would if -- or 
Security Title would be more likely to have it because 
they are were the ones that actually ordered the survey, 
because they wouldn't write the title insurance on it 
without a survey. They wouldn't take -- because of the 
problems over there on the east-west lines, they would 
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1 never write a title policy on a piece of property in 
2 Centerville without a survey. 
3 Q But as far as you can recollect, then, 
4 Mr. Tingy and you both reviewed the survey and agreed 
5 that the fence line would be where it's at? 
6 A Yep. 
7 Q Were you aware -- I guess I'm asking a 
8 question you've already answered, but let me ask it 
9 anyway. Were you aware then that the fence line was not 
10 on the deed line, the property deed line? 
11 A What are you asking me, Mike, that I wasn't 
12 aware'that it was --
13 Q Were you aware at all of a discrepancy 
14 between the fence line and the deed description on your 
15 warranty deed? 
16 A None whatsoever. We didn't -- in those 
17 days, you know -- and if I remember correctly, that 
18 measurement comes from center of roads up there. And 
19 so, you know -- in the old days we followed the old 
20 fence lines. 
21 Q Did anyone ever say to you at anytime or 
22 make any indication to you or infer in any way of a 
23 discrepancy between the fence line and the deed 
24 description? 
25 A Never. 
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1 Q Did Mr. Tingy ever say anything to you with 
2 regard to a discrepancy between the fence line? 
3 A Never. 
4 Q When did you first learn of this 
5 discrepancy, or have you heard of it prior to today? 
6 A Well, yeah, but it hasn't been very long 
7 ago. Merlyn Roberts, who has been a friend of mine --
8 she was Bill Tingy's daughter, and I've known her ever 
9 since she was about the size of Hector's pup. And 
10 she -- 'cause she called me and said that there had b°en 
11 a question arise on that line and asked me a few 
12 questions similar to what we're discussing here today. 
13 And that's the first time that I ever heard 
14 of any discrepancy on that property line. 
15 Q The Madsen's, who purchased the property 
16 from you, did they ever ask or make any sort of inquiry 
17 or any kind of a statement with regard to the fence 
18 line? 
19 A Never. 
20 Q So as far as you knew and understood, you 
21 and Mr. Tingy were in agreement that the fence line was 
22 the appropriate boundary? 
23 A Yes. 
24 Q Did you ever use this disputed strip 
25 indicated in the survey, this 12 feet between the fence 
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1 line and the deed line? 
2 A No. Bill farmed his side of the fence, and 
3 I farmed mine. 
4 Q Did he farm right up to the fence; do you 
5 recall? 
6 A Yeah, pretty close. There was some old wild 
7 roses there, and, you know, most farmers would harrow as 
8 close as they could get to the fence without tucking 
9 onto the roses and jerking the fence out. 
10 And so it seems to me like he left a little 
11 strip, maybe three or four feet, that he didn't keep the 
12 weeds down, but he got up as close -- if my memory 
13 serves me, there's a difference in elevation a little 
14 bit, was when I moved there, and the fence was on the 
15 high side. I'm a little higher than that property. 
16 Haven't looked at it for years, but it seems to me 
17 that's the way it was when I lived there. But he got up 
18 pretty close to that fence. 
19 MR. ROBERTS: Off the record for just a 
20 minute. 
21 (A discussion was held off the record.) 
22 Q (By Mr. Roberts) During the ten years that 
23 you owned this property, was there any dispute between 
24 you and Mr. Tingy as to the fence line? 
25 A Never. 
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Q Never any dispute at all? 
A (The witness shakes his head,) 
Q Or was there any dispute that was brought 
to your attention from that time that you sold the 
property to the Madsen's up until the time that you 
spoke of earlier when Ms. De La Melena brought it to 
your attention? 
A Never. 
MR. ROBERTS: That's all the questions I 
have. 
MR. HOCKINGS: Can we ask a couple? 
MR. ROBERTS: You may do so. 
EXAMINATION 
BY MR. HOCKINGS: 
Q I'd like to know if Mr. Green gave 
Mr. Madsen a survey when you sold to him. 
A I don't think so. I know I furnished 
Mr. Madsen with the title policy. And as a general 
rule, when you're selling real estate, that suffices for 
the buyer if he gets a title policy. 
Now, if the title company thinks that they 
ought to have a survey -- just like the case when I 
bought it from Therice -- they'll request one. 
But in my case we had already had it 
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(By Mr. Hunt) 
Q. How would you describe the property at the 
time you purchased it? 
A. Just some land. 
Q. Would you call it a vacant lot? A field? 
A. It was a field. 
Q. Did it have any kind of grass or vegetation 
on it? 
A. It probably had some vegetation on it from 
field, farm produce. 
Q. Let me ask the obvious question, then. Had 
it been used by your father in his truck farming 
business? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And was it a field in which he grew 
vegetables or produce? 
A. Vegetables, yes. 
Q. And was it currently in that type of use 
when you purchased it? 
A. Yes. 
Q. How long was it from the time of your 
purchase on February 14th, 1978, until you built or 
erected a home? 
A. We began building right -- I think -- letfs 
see, this was in April -- or February? About a 
month. We started planning the home and it was 
Rockie Dustin * Capitol Reporters 
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(By Mr. Hunt) 
completed in September of that same year. We moved in 
in September. 
Q. Of 1978? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you occupied the home at that point in 
time? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you have any idea how long your father 
had owned this property prior to his transfer to his 
corporation and then to you? 
A. I don't know in years. I don't know. It's 
been a long time. 
Q. Let me take you back to the time when you 
purchased the property on February 14th of 1978. Did 
you obtain a survey of that property? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And in that packet of documents right by 
your right hand there is a survey that has a date in 
the lower left hand corner of February 21, 1978, and 
that would be marked as Exhibit 2? 
A. Right. 
Q. Did you order that survey to be surveyed on 
your property? 
A. I personally didn't. 
Q. Can you tell me who did? 
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(By Mr. Hunt) 
A. Bill and Sylvia Tingey did. 
Q. Your folks? 
A. Yes. 
Q. On your behalf? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you ever have an occasion to look at 
that survey? 
A. I probably looked at it when I got it, and 
then I probably looked at it when I was going to sel 
my house. 
Q. Did you sell your house? 
A. When I was going to sell my house. 
Q. When were you going to sell your house? 
A. In 1989. 
Q. But at the time that you received it in 
1978, you looked at it as well, did you not? 
A. I probably did, because I had it in my 
possession. 
Q. And were you aware at that time that the 
fence that was on the property was not at your 
property line? 
A. I personally did not have that knowledge. 
Q. You did not? 
A. No. 
Q. Did your father? 
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(By Mr. Hunt) 
A. I don't remember specifically. If they 
asked for it, we would have given it to them, but I 
don't remember specifically. 
Q. Did your husband take part in these 
transactions as well? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Is he still alive? 
A. No. 
Q. Do you retain all the files of whatever was 
accumulated at that time? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Would you please tell me what took place, 
after you built your house in 1978, with the property 
to the west of your home, and particularly the 12-foot 
strip that borders the Hocking's property, which is 
approximately 12 feet by 120 feet. 
A. On that strip there, we put raspberries. 
And there is a little fence, just for all the 
berries. I put some other bushes there, fruit-bearing 
bushes. I have the fruit trees, lawn. There is a 
sprinkling system. 
Q. And can you tell me the date that these were 
installed? 
A. Oh, probably the first -- within the first 
five years that we lived there. I don't know exact 
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(By Mr. Hunt) 
dates. 
Q. But it was after you received the survey of 
February of 1978? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And did you put them in that portion on the 
survey? You are welcome to look at that document. I 
have highlighted that in yellow so you can see. Are 
those plants that you have described, and sprinkling 
system, within that portion? 
A. Some of them. 
Q. And do they come right up to the --
MR. STAHLE: Just a second, Hollis. Off the 
record. 
(Discussion off the record.) 
Q. Let me redirect my question, and I 
appreciate that correction, I'm talking about the 
south border of your property, the north border of the 
Hocking's property. I think you understood what I was 
talking about, but I misspoke, and I appreciate that 
correction. 
Would your answer be the same if we make 
that correction from west to south? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And so those plants and sprinkling system, 
does it come right up to the existing fence, the 
Rockie Dustin * Capitol Reporters 
18 
(By Mr. Hunt) 
sprinkling system? 
A. I think it's pretty close. Part of it is. 
Some of it is. 
Q. Tell me what kind of sprinkling system it 
is. 
A. Rain Bird. 
Q. Isn't it correct that all of those 
improvements were put in after your survey of February 
21st, 1978? 
A. Right. 
Q. Can you tell me what is immediately -- and 
again looking at Exhibit No. 2 -- what is immediately 
north of that 12-foot strip that's highlighted? 
A. Garden. 
Q. Is it a garden? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You have not installed, erected or built any 
other buildings immediately adjacent to that strip? 
A. No. 
Q. Can you tell me how far away from the strip 
that the nearest building or house is? That would be 
going from the yellow strip to your home, or garage, 
or what other improvements you would have on that 
property. 
A. My house. 
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(By Mr. Hunt) 
paid taxes on the strip referred to as the 12-foot by 
120-foot strip of land? 
A. We paid taxes on the description in our 
deed. 
Q. And are you aware that your deeded 
description does not include that 12-foot strip? 
A. I am now. 
Q. And weren't you aware of that in 1978? 
A. No, I was not. 
Q. Was your husband? 
A. He may have, but it would be kind of hard t 
find out. 
Q. I understand that. And I don't pretend to 
have those kinds of powers. 
At any time since 1978, when you purchased 
your property -- when the property was deeded to you 
as a gift from your parents, have you ever attempted 
to pay taxes on this 12-foot strip? 
A. No. 
Q. Your counsel has filed an answer and a 
counterclaim to the Hocking's complaint against you, 
and they assert on your behalf that in fact you claim 
that property as your own, the 12-foot by 120-foot 
strip; is that correct? I realize you did not draft 
this document, and I'm not trying to put you in --
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